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Blinded by the Light: Common Law and the
Dangers of Cyberlawyering*
John C. Scheffel**
In June of 1996, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals de-
cided an extraordinarily significant case regarding computer
technology. The facts of this case represent a cornucopia of is-
sues for cyber-lawyers and are especially relevant for this In-
ternet symposium.' In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,2 a fellow
named Matthew Zeidenberg copied a database of telephone
numbers and addresses onto a website he created and hosted on
one of his home computers. Mr. Zeidenberg then went into the
business of selling access to this database on a per-use basis.3
The facts in ProCD could lead one to speculate about the
jurisdiction in which Zeidenberg could be sued for his activities
on the web. Other questions also arise: Did his activities violate
the publisher's copyright? Did the activities vis a vis the web
service provider violate someone's copyright? Did subsequent
website operators, who relayed the file around the Internet, vio-
late someone's copyright? Did the end-users violate someone's
copyright? Further, who should be taxed on the revenues that
Mr. Zeidenberg receives? What liability might his friends who
linked to the website have for Mr. Zeidenberg's potential bad
acts?
* This perspective is adopted from concluding remarks given at the 1998 Pace
Law Review Symposium, Untangling the Web: The Legal Implications of the
Internet at Pace University School of Law on March 20, 1998.
** John C. Scheffel, Esq. is Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and Sec-
retary of Physicians' Online, Inc., a venture-capital-stage company in Tarrytown,
New York that operates an Internet-based information, communication and trans-
action service for physicians. Prior to joining Physicians' Online in 1996, Mr.
Scheffel held a variety of positions at IBM, principally related to the management
of intellectual property and employment related litigation. Mr. Scheffel also holds
an appointment as an Adjunct Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law,
where he teaches courses in intellectual property law.
1. The 1998 Pace University Internet Symposium, Untangling the Web: The
Legal Implications of the Internet.
2. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
3. See id. at 1450.
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The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Eas-
terbrook, dealt with the primary matter that was in front of the
court on appeal. 4 The threshold issue was whether the terms
contained in the shrink wrap license agreement that was pro-
vided with Mr. Zeidenberg's CD-ROM formed a contract be-
tween Mr. Zeidenberg and ProCD, the publisher of the CD-
ROM. 5 Remarkably, the Seventh Circuit found the contract
binding, becoming the first federal appellate court to uphold a
shrink wrap license agreement. 6 The Court upheld the ProCD
license agreement in the face of several federal appellate court
and state court opinions that had found the terms of a shrink
wrap license agreement not to be part of a contract between the
end-user and the publisher.7
The extraordinary thing about this case is not the court's
determination that shrink wrap licenses are valid; many practi-
tioners have assumed this to be true. The extraordinary thing
is that twenty years after shrink wrap licenses became an in-
dustry standard, and at least fifteen years since IBM began
mass-marketing the personal computer, a federal appellate
court was, for the first time, interpreting the meaning of these
license provisions. In thinking about cyber-law, or the applica-
tion of the law to Internet technology, I think the application of
the law to computer technology in general is a fine model and a
model that I would encourage courts, industry, and practition-
ers who self-style themselves as cyber-lawyers to think about.
Computers, in one form or another, have been in use for the
past 50 years. When computers were first introduced in the
mid-1940s, there was not a widely developed or reported body of
law on contract issues relating to computer technology. More-
over, copyright issues relating to computer software did not de-
velop for at least 30 years after the introduction of computer
technology. During these years, market demand and market
forces, such as the mass distribution of PCs and the mass distri-
bution of software, led to an increasing number of computer-
related cases being brought into court. Also, issues of copy-
righting and contracting became more acute. In deciding cases
4. See id. at 1448-49.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 1455.




dealing with the ability to copyright computer software or the
appropriate contractual routine regarding the purchase of com-
puter technology, courts applied, without exception, traditional
principles of copyright and contract law.
However, in the most recent computer-related cases, courts
have relied most heavily upon historical non-computer prece-
dent. After certain, perhaps misguided attempts to define the
copyright scheme for computer software, courts have increas-
ingly looked to more traditional factors to determine whether
certain media, i.e., radio screenplays, radio plays, and stage
dramas, infringed upon one another. This historical analysis
has led to, with narrow exception,8 the rejection of sui generis
legislation, the rejection of special consideration for computer
technology, and the adoption of historical common law.
I believe that as practitioners in the field of cyber-law, we
should follow the historical model. Frankly, I am always scared
by the suggestions that we should start from first principles in
debating issues relating to cyber-law. Some believe that the In-
ternet is somehow different, and that the Internet provides an
opportunity to remake the law. In my classes, nothing troubles
me more than this notion. I have moved away from trying to
teach much in the area of cyber-law because I get first principle
discussions about the Communications Decency Act 9 from those
who neither understand the Act, nor have the First Amendment
predicate in order to have that discussion.
This area of cyber-law lends itself to being a mile-wide-and-
inch-deep discussion. This, I believe, is a real danger for us.
The real danger is that we will allow or create premature and
unneeded legislation out of our own desire to regulate the field.
For example, one mistake that could be made would be to draft
legislation relating to trusted certificate authorities before there
are any trusted certificate authorities and before there is any
market demand or any experience relating to what the stan-
dards of liability perhaps should be for trusted certificate au-
thorities. Another mistake would be to regulate the domain
name arena whenever we find competing groups of policy au-
8. For example, one exception is the specific provisions of the Copyright Act
with regard to linking computer technology with the right to make archival or
back-up copies. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1998).




thorities coming up with their own competing proposals regard-
ing the control of the domain name registries and the like.
Those areas are opportunities, I believe, for great mischief
among lawyers and policy-makers who may find it an interest-
ing area to discuss and practice in, but who do not have in mind
the interest of individuals or parties seeking to resolve real
problems.
At a cyber-law seminar two years ago in Chicago, the Hon-
orable Frank Easterbrook, who wrote the opinion in the
Zeidenberg case, gave a now well-known presentation. 10 In
Judge Easterbrook's view, there is nothing special about cyber-
space. In his lecture, he stressed that we, as lawyers, should be
careful not to look at issues related to the Internet and focus on
their "Internetness." That is, we should not focus on Internet
issues that could make cyber-law unique, simply to engender
publicity. Rather, Judge Easterbrook believes that we should
focus on the fundamental history of the common law and the
appropriate legal rules to apply in situations that happen to in-
volve the Internet. 11
To that end, instead of talking about a "new" type of In-
ternet related law, we should focus on traditional applications
of tort law, copyright law, or trademark law. I think that the
historical application of those legal principles should be what
guides us as practitioners in the cyber-law field. I certainly do
not think there is any question that compared to other countries
around the world, we have done an admirable job of applying
common law, existing copyright, or other intellectual property
rules to computer technology. My hope is that in applying those
same rules to emerging issues relating to the Internet, we will
continue to apply the existing body of law. We should continue
to follow the pattern of applying traditional precepts of common
law to computer technology and we should resist the temptation
to develop a "let's look at the Internet" approach to resolving
Internet-related legal issues.
10. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996).
11. See id. at 208.
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